By Ezenwa Nwagwu
The appointment of the Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) has long been a subject of debate in Nigeria’s democratic discourse.
Some have argued that allowing the President to nominate the INEC Chairman compromises the commission’s independence, fueling calls for reforms, including the recommendation by the Justice Uwais Electoral Reform Committee report that the National Judicial Council (NJC) or another independent body should handle such appointments.
While these concerns are valid in their own right, it is my opinion that the real issue is often misdiagnosed. So, the crux of this discourse is to stir up a conversation that expands the discussion around who should appoint the INEC Chairman, and hoping that the conversation leads to a selection process that is acceptable.
Few months from now, we will move into the political season, where most conversations will have political and partisan colouration. So, for me, now is the best time to initiate meaningful conversations when heads are still calm.
Indeed, while the yearning of many of the proposals on appointment of INEC leadership is to insulate the process from executive interference – a goal we can all agree on – the key issue is whether this concern is being addressed the right way.
The debates, I believe, have often overlooked a crucial question: Is Nigeria’s electoral process flawed because the President nominates the INEC Chairman, or is the real problem the failure of oversight institutions to do their job?
Now, let me attempt to explain why this question is necessary. There is a widespread misconception, particularly among Nigerians who are not invested in the electoral process, that the President Singlehandedly appoints the INEC Chairman. In reality, the process is not that simple, it involves multiple layers of scrutiny.
The process involves the President nominating a candidate for national chairman and national commissioners as the case may be. The nominees are sent by the president to the Department of State Services (DSS) for security Screening. The DSS profiles the nominee and submits a report on their suitability. The President takes the names to the Council of State for review. The nominee’s credentials and DSS report are presented to the Council of State, which provides advisory input. Based on their advice, the President sends the names to the Senate for Confirmation. The Senate screens and approves.
Given this multi-step process, the key question is: Can the President Singlehandedly manipulate the entire layers of scrutiny, the DSS, the Council of State and the National Assembly to get an “unqualified candidate” appointed?
The second question is, If such manipulation of the DSS, the Council of State, and the National Assembly by the President is possible, is he not also capable of influencing the NJC?.
The answer to these questions lies in the failure of oversight institutions to diligently execute their duties.
The Council of State for instance is composed of individuals with vast political and legal experience, who are not seeking political office. According to Section 153(1)(b) and Third Schedule, Part I(B) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), the Council of State comprises: The President, The Vice President, all former Presidents and Heads of State of Nigeria; All former Chief Justices of Nigeria; The President of the Senate; The Speaker of the House of Representatives; All State Governors and The Attorney General of the Federation.
These are individuals with vast political and legal experience, who are not seeking political office. If they fail to properly scrutinize and advise against an unsuitable nominee, then the problem is not with the process but with institutional integrity.
Although the Council’s advice is not binding, it plays a crucial role in guiding presidential decisions on national governance, and provides recommendations on important issues such: The appointment of the INEC Chairman and Commissioners, The appointment of the Chief Justice of Nigeria and other judicial officers, Pardons, reprieves, and the exercise of the prerogative of mercy.
However, on the part of the National Assembly, it has a constitutional responsibility to carry out oversight. The question is: Does the National Assembly have power to reject a nominee from the President? The answer is yes, the National Assembly has the power to reject nominees. A clear example was the rejection of Lauretta Onochie due to concerns over her partisan background.
The Senate Committee on electoral matters has a duty to investigate nominees’ past affiliations and competencies. Do they carry out this responsibility during screening of nominees? This is a question they will need to answer.
It is important to state that the screening process is expected to be quite rigorous, often requiring bipartisan support for nominees to be confirmed. This means that senators from different parties, such as the ruling party and the opposition parties must work together and agree to confirm the nominee. This ensures that the nominee has broad support and is not simply being pushed through by one party.
The multi-party composition of the National Assembly following the 2023 elections, presents an opportunity for robust scrutiny of the INEC Chairman nominee. It is expected that the opposition parties will be vigilant and vocal during the screening process, raising concerns and objections as necessary to ensure the integrity of the appointment process.
Also, for those asking that the NJC be allowed to appoint the INEC Chairman, my challenge is, do we outsource the weaknesses of the oversight institutions and then pass that on to another institution that has no proof that they have been inoculated against the same weaknesses?
Advocates for NJC appointments argue that the judiciary is more insulated from political influence. However, judicial appointments in Nigeria have also been questioned for their transparency. If the NJC is susceptible to political interference, will shifting INEC appointments to it guarantee impartiality?
Moreover, there is also a constitutional concern: INEC is an independent commission established by the Constitution, just like the NJC. Can one commission legally appoint leadership for another? Such a change would require constitutional amendments, raising concerns about feasibility and unintended consequences.
My point is, let us not, in trying to solve one problem, create more problems. For me, the appointment process itself is not inherently flawed—the real challenge is how do we deal with the weaknesses of the institutions that have oversight responsibility on those appointments and ensuring a transparent and credible selection.
My argument is that the independence of INEC is not just about who appoints its leadership but about whether institutions tasked with oversight are doing their job.
It is my opinion that Instead of shifting the responsibility of appointment to another body which may not be immune to political influence, we should be asking: how do we strengthen the already existing institutions to perform their oversight functions effectively and ensure accountability in the appointment process. If the DSS conducts thorough background checks, if the Council of State provides objective assessments, and if the National Assembly rigorously vets nominees, then the issue of partisanship in INEC appointments would be minimized.
My second point is that the argument that INEC lacks independence solely because the President appoints its leadership is overly simplistic. The true test of independence lies in institutional integrity and functionality.
This takes me to the second aspect of my discourse which includes our approach to elections.
Take for instance the Constitution mandates that INEC should receive its budget one year before an election to ensure financial independence. But does INEC always receive its funds on time? Who is ensuring compliance? The same institutions responsible for enforcing these rules are often the ones failing in their duties.
In concluding, I will say a major challenge we have with our elections are majorly attitudinal, and not necessarily about legislation. Political parties, politicians, security agencies, Civil Societies, Media and citizens, we must embrace a new attitude towards our elections.
Ultimately, strengthening institutions and embracing a fact-based approach will do more for electoral integrity than merely shifting appointment powers from one body to another.
Ezenwa Nwagwu, is the executive director, Peering Advocacy and Advancement Center in Africa (PAACA)
